- Career prospects and effort incentives: evidence from professional soccer (with Jeanine Miklós-Thal), Management Science, Vol. 62(6), pp. 1645-1667, 2016. Last working paper version. Online Appendix: Download. Reprinted in Learning in Labour Markets, edited by Michael Waldman, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2017.
Column (in German): ZEW News 9/2009.
- Belief precision and effort incentives in promotion contests (with Jeanine Miklós-Thal), Economic Journal, Vol. 125(589), pp. 1952-1963, 2015. Last working paper version.
- Regulation of pharmaceutical prices: evidence from a reference price reform in Denmark (with Ulrich Kaiser, Susan Mendez, and Thomas Rønde), Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 36, pp. 174-187, 2014. Last working paper version.
Column (in German): DIW Wochenbericht 14/2014.
- Machine predictions and human decisions with variation in payoffs and skill (with Michael A. Ribers), DIW Discussion Paper Nr. 1911 (download pdf).
Human decision-making differs due to variation in both incentives and available information. This constitutes a substantial challenge for the evaluation of whether and how machine learning predictions can improve decision outcomes. We propose a framework that incorporates machine learning on large-scale data into a choice model featuring heterogeneity in decision maker payoff functions and predictive skill. We apply this framework to the major health policy problem of improving the efficiency in antibiotic prescribing in primary care, one of the leading causes of antibiotic resistance. Our analysis reveals large variation in physicians’ skill to diagnose bacterial infections and in how physicians trade off the externality inherent in antibiotic use against its curative benefit. Counterfactual policy simulations show that the combination of machine learning predictions with physician diagnostic skill results in a 25.4 percent reduction in prescribing and achieves the largest welfare gains compared to alternative policies for both estimated physician as well as conservative social planner preference weights on the antibiotic resistance externality.
- Physician effects in antibiotic prescribing: evidence from physician exits (with Shan Huang) – DIW Discussion Paper Nr. 1958 (download pdf).
Human antibiotic consumption is considered the main driver of antibiotic resistance. Reducing human antibiotic consumption without compromising health care quality poses one of the most important global health policy challenges. A crucial condition for designing effective policies is to identify who drives antibiotic treatment decisions, physicians or patient demand. We measure the causal effect of physician practice style on antibiotic intake and health outcomes exploiting variation in patient-physician relations due to physician exits in general practice in Denmark. We estimate that physician practice style accounts for 53 to 56 percent of between-clinic differences in all antibiotic consumption, and for 74 to 81 percent in the consumption of second-line antibiotic drugs. We find little evidence that low prescribing styles adversely affect health outcomes measured as preventable hospitalizations due to infections. Our findings suggest that policies to curb antibiotic resistance are most effective when aimed at improving physician decision-making, in particular when they target high prescribers. High prescribing practice styles are positively associated with physician age and negatively with staff size and the availability of diagnostic tools, suggesting that improvements in the quality of diagnostic information is an important path to improved decisions.
- The value of data for prediction policy problems: evidence from antibiotic prescribing (with Shan Huang and Michael Ribers), DIW Discussion Paper Nr. 1939 (download pdf).
Column (in German): DIW Wochenbericht 13-14/2021.
Large-scale data show promise to provide efficiency gains through individualized risk predictions in many business and policy settings. Yet, assessments of the degree of data-enabled efficiency improvements remain scarce. We quantify the value of the availability of a variety of data combinations for tackling the policy problem of curbing antibiotic resistance, where the reduction of inefficient antibiotic use requires improved diagnostic prediction. Focusing on antibiotic prescribing for suspected urinary tract infections in primary care in Denmark, we link individual-level administrative data with microbiological laboratory test outcomes to train a machine learning algorithm predicting bacterial test results. For various data combinations, we assess out of sample prediction quality and efficiency improvements due to prediction-based prescription policies. The largest gains in prediction quality can be achieved using simple characteristics such as patient age and gender or patients’ health care data. However, additional patient background data lead to further incremental policy improvements even though gains in prediction quality are small. Our findings suggest that evaluating prediction quality against the ground truth only may not be sufficient to quantify the potential for policy improvements.
- Battling antibiotic resistance: can machine learning improve prescribing? (with Michael A. Ribers), DIW Discussion Paper Nr. 1803 (download pdf).
Antibiotic resistance constitutes a major health threat. Predicting bacterial causes of infections is key to reducing antibiotic misuse, a leading driver of antibiotic resistance. We train a machine learning algorithm on administrative and microbiological laboratory data from Denmark to predict diagnostic test outcomes for urinary tract infections. Based on predictions, we develop policies to improve prescribing in primary care, highlighting the relevance of physician expertise and policy implementation when patient distributions vary over time. The proposed policies delay antibiotic prescriptions for some patients until test results are known and give them instantly to others. We find that machine learning can reduce antibiotic use by 7.42 percent without reducing the number of treated bacterial infections. As Denmark is one of the most conservative countries in terms of antibiotic use, this result is likely to be a lower bound of what can be achieved elsewhere.
We analyze the effects of a hypothetical payment card fee regulation on bank profits, consumer welfare, and merchant welfare. We model consumers’ and merchants’ bank choices for debit card services, cardholders’ demand for card usage (conditional on bank choice), and how banks account for these in setting card fees to their customers. To estimate the model, we use bank-level data and survey data from the Norwegian debit card scheme, BankAxept. We conduct counterfactual exercises to analyze the effects of interchange fee regulations in the debit card scheme.
- A note on regressions with interval data on a regressor (with Daniel Cerquera and Francois Laisney). Online Appendix: Download
Former title: Considerations on partially identified regression models, Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper 2012-024, BETA (Bureau d’Economie Théorique et Appliquée) Working Paper No. 2012-07, Online Appendix: Download
- Consumer welfare and unobserved heterogeneity in discrete choice models: the value of Alpine road tunnels (with Daniel Cerquera), Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper 2010-095
Work in progress
- Selection bias in routine surveillance of antibiotic resistance (with Michael Ribers)
- Career concerns and managerial risk taking: evidence from the NFL (with Paul Bose and Florian Schütt)
- Information acquisition and treatment decisions: the case of antibiotic prescribing (with Michael Ribers)
- The value of data: evidence from web tracking (with Luis Aguiar, Tomaso Duso, Jonas Hannane, and Christian Peukert)